Introduction
In a growing number of metropolitan areas, the construction or extension of a rail transit system has been advocated by policy makers as a way to address the numerous externalities associated with a heavy reliance on the automobile for the journey to work. However, in many of these same areas, rail transit proposals have encountered significant opposition from neighborhood groups (Pendered 1997 . Hence if station-induced crime is a reality, station openings may worsen, rather than mitigate, urban sprawl. In addition, to achieve transit-oriented development, significant subsidies may be required to offset the cost of crime.
There are reasons to believe, however, that the opening of a rail station may actually cause neighborhood crime to fall, rather than rise. Although the station may increase access to the changes in crime rate trends, ignoring other explanatory factors that may have been correlated with these dates. Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) also used Atlanta data to estimate a simple neighborhood crime model that served as an auxiliary equation to their hedonic price analysis of the impact of MARTA rail stations on residential property values. The crime model was used to estimate the indirect effects that stations may have on the values of nearby properties by attracting criminal activity to station areas. In their basic model, Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) found that the density of neighborhood crime is higher in those census tracts whose centroids are within a quarter mile of a station. However, in a model containing interactions, the latter effect was found to vary with neighborhood income, distance from downtown, and whether the station had a parking lot.2 Finally, Block and Block (2000) mapped reported street robberies (actual and attempted) on Chicago's Northeast Side and within the Bronx borough of New York City. For both of these places they found that there was a strong relationship between street robbery and propinquity to a rapid transit station. The number of robberies tended to peak a few blocks away from the stations.
A Spatial Economic Model of Crime
The economic model of crime (Becker 1968 ) is aspatial in the sense that all crimes are assumed to be committed by residents of the home community. This assumption is untenable if the objective is to explain neighborhood crime when criminals are mobile across neighborhoods. In this section a simple model that adds a spatial dimension to the standard crime model is presented. The objectives are twofold. The first objective is to identify those factors that account for differences in the amount of property crime across neighborhoods. The model is also relevant to that subset of violent crimes that are economically motivated. The second objective is to relate these factors to the percentage of the neighborhood that is served by rail transit.
Consider the average resident (R) of neighborhood H. Assume that within a given time period, he must decide whether he will commit a crime and whether this crime will be committed within the home neighborhood. The joint probability that he is a criminal and commits his crime in H equals the marginal probability that he is a criminal times the conditional probability that he commits the crime in the home neighborhood given that he is a criminal:
= R(C) X PR(H I C).
(1)
The factors that determine the marginal probability are identified by the standard crime model. In this model, the expected net return (n) from committing a crime is defined as the expected payoff (w) minus the direct cost incurred in committing the crime (c) minus the product of the probability of apprehension and conviction (p) and the prospective penalty if convicted (f):
= w -c -pf.
The expected net return from committing a crime can be defined separately for a crime committed by the resident within his home neighborhood (T7H) and outside his home neighborhood (rco):
2 Although this paper relies on some of the same data as Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) , there is little similarity between their models and the models estimated here. The latter are based on a stronger theoretical underpinning and include a more refined set of both crime measures and explanatory variables. In addition, Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) do not investigate differences in rail transit's effect on crime between central city and suburban neighborhoods, which is a major focus of the current paper. rH = WH -PHf, 
where c is limited to the costs of commuting to the crime (to), which are assumed to be negligible if the crime is committed within the home neighborhood. The resident will be a criminal if the maximum expected net return from crime exceeds the benefit of being law-abiding, which equals foregone expected earnings in legitimate activity (e) net of jourey-to-work costs (j) plus the monetary equivalent of the psychic return from good citizenship (g):
Given that Equation 5 is satisfied, the resident who is a criminal will commit his crime in H only if the expected net return from crime is higher there than elsewhere:
Equation 5 defines the variables that affect the marginal probability, whereas Equation 6 defines the variables that affect the conditional probability. Together these are the variables that affect the joint probability:3 pR =f(WH, Wo,pH,Po, to, e,j, g).
Although the above model adds a spatial dimension to the economic model of crime, Equation 7 provides limited guidance on how this dimension might be incorporated into an empirical model, since it is unclear how to operationalize the concept "outside the home neighborhood." To further refine the spatial dimension of the model, it is assumed that to is proportional to travel time. Travel time is equal to distance times the inverse of the speed of travel. Two implications can be drawn from this assumption. First, expected net returns to crime outside the home neighborhood rise as crime targets with higher payoffs or lower probabilities of apprehension are found closer to the home neighborhood. Second, net returns will also rise if travel times decline, holding distances constant.4 These implications suggest that Equation 7 be rewritten as H = f(H, PH, e,j, g, AH, SH),
where AH is the proximity to high payoff crimes (net of expected penalties) outside the home neighborhood, and SH is the speed of travel from H to other neighborhoods.5 The total amount of crime in H committed by residents equals pR times the number of residents.
3 Because the study area includes only neighborhoods located within the same state, f can be treated as a spatial constant and therefore excluded from Equation 7. However, the two counties included in the area do have their own judicial circuit courts, and sentences may vary between these courts. To the extent that perceived differences in f between the two counties that arise because of differences in sentencing are time invariant, they are controlled for the estimated models. If intercounty perceptions of fchange over the four years covered by the panel, this will bias the estimated effects of rail transit on crime density only if these changes are correlated with the census tract measure of transit access. There are no obvious reasons to expect this correlation. 4 Higher travel times may reduce net expected payoffs for reasons other than the direct costs associated with travel. For example, Glaeser and Sacerdote (1996) note that the probability of arrest may vary directly with travel time: the longer it takes to return to a safe haven after committing a crime, the higher the probability of apprehension. Other reasons the probability of arrest may vary directly with travel time are (i) criminals may have less knowledge of distant areas, making it more difficult to escape; and (ii) criminals may be more recognizable as nonresidents in neighborhoods more distant from home. 5 The model assumes that there is substitution between crime committed at home and crime committed other places so that rail access will reduce local crime. There is the possibility that a home criminal could continue to commit as many crimes within the home neighborhood as before rail access, and after his neighborhood obtains rail access also commit crimes in other neighborhoods. The assumption that there is spatial substitution by the home criminal is reasonable as long as time is considered a binding constraint.
Cnmes in H are also committed by outsiders. The joint probability that the average outsider is a cnminal and commits his cnme in H is PH = P°(C) X P°(H I C).
As is true for a resident, an outsider will be a cnminal only if the expected net return from cnme exceeds the benefit of being law abiding. However, the factors that determine the marginal probability [P°(C)] that the average outsider is a cnminal are constant across neighborhoods. Hence only the factors that determine the conditional probability [P°(H | C)] are relevant.6 Given that the average outsider is a cnminal, the cnme will occur in H only if the expected payoff net of expected penalties and commuting costs is higher there than elsewhere:
WH -PHf-tH > WO -POf to.
This condition implies that P°(H I C) will vary inversely with PH and directly with WH. P°(H I C) Wi11 also vary directly with the proximity of H to the average outside criminal (N) and the speed of travel to H from other neighborhoods, because each of these factors increase net returns from crime in H by decreasing tH.7 8 Thus,
The total amount of crime in H committed by outside criminals equals P°(H \ C) times the number of outside criminals. The total amount of crime in H (CT ) is the sum of the cnmes committed by residents (CR) and by outsiders (C°):
Hence collecting together the arguments in Equations 9 and 12 yields:9 CH = f (i, e, g, WH)PH)AH) SH,NH)
Tulning to the effect of transit on neighborhood cnme, the percentage of the neighborhood served by rail transit (T) may affect CH by reducing the average journey-to-work costs of neighborhood residents (j) and by increasing the average speed of travel between locations within H and other neighborhoods (SH). Suppressing H subscnpts, the partial denvative of neighborhood cnme with respect to transit can be expressed as DCT/0T = ACR/0S X AS/t3T + t3C°/0S X AS/a3T + ACR/0S X AC/0S X t3S/0T.
6 Another way to see this is that there is little difference in the stock of outside criminals from the perspective of any two neighborhoods, assuming the community is composed of many small neighborhoods. The theoretical model suggests that the partial derivative of neighborhood crime with respect to transit will vary across neighborhoods, because in Equation 14 the magnitudes of DCR/0S, AC°/0S, and DS/0T all vary. In the case of DCR/0S, if the expected payoff from crime within the home neighborhood (WH) iS sufficiently high, the expected net return from crime will remain higher there than elsewhere even if travel times decline to other neighborhoods. Similarly, if expected payoffs outside the home neighborhood (AH) are sufficiently low, a reduction in travel times will not entice residents to commit their crimes outside the home neighborhood. On the other hand, for a sufficiently low value of WH or a sufficiently high value of AH, the expected net retuin from crime will be higher outside the home neighborhood both before and after a unit increase in SH. Hence the absolute magnitude of aCR/0S will be relatively small at low and at high values of WH and AH, implying domesloped relationships between l0CR/0Sl and each of these variables.
In the case of AC°/0S, if the expected payoff from crime in H (WH) iS sufficiently high, the outside criminal will find that the expected net return from crime is higher in H than elsewhere both before and after a unit increase in SH. Similarly, if the outside criminal lives sufficiently close to H, implying a high value of NH, the expected net return to crime will be higher in H both before and after an increase in SH. On the other hand, for a sufficiently low value of WH or NH (the latter indicating the criminal lives a long distance from H), the expected net return from crime will be relatively low in H even after a reduction in travel time to H. Again dome-sloped relationships are implied between |0C°/0S| and WH and NH.
Finally, the absolute magnitude of dS/0T is expected to be larger in poor neighborhoods. The residents in poor neighborhoods are more dependent on public transit, so the availability of rail transit causes a larger switch from buses. Because the time savings are larger going from bus to rail than from auto to rail, the average resident of a poor neighborhood experiences a relatively greater reduction in S from an increase in T. 
The primary dependent variable is the density of crime (i.e., crimes per acre) within-tract i in year t for one of the crime measures. Although the crime rate (number of crimes/population) is the more commonly used crime measure, crime density is the more appropriate variable if the objective is to explain the spatial distribution of crimes across neighborhoods.13'14 However, for the sake of comparison, both the crime density and the crime rate alternatively serve as the dependent variable in the estimation of the FE models. Also, as noted below, the major conclusions of this study hold regardless of whether the number of crimes is adjusted by the area or the population of the tract. Because the interest is in the effect of rail access on crime in the area surrounding the rail station, the number of crimes committed on station property is subtracted from the total number of tract crimes in 1 By boundary effects I am referring to the problem of measuring variables that describe conditions outside the tract. For these variables (specifically, the tract's proximity to jobs or to poor people, as described below), a larger geographical area that is centered on the study area is required. The seven-county Atlanta region satisfies this requirement. 12 A MARTA station impact area is a circle centered on the station with a quarter mile radius. This is defined more completely below. 13 The primary problem with the crime rate is that many neighborhoods contain nonresidential crime targets (e.g., commercial and industrial property), which will affect crime density, but not the crime rate, in a consistent fashion across tracts. These nonresidential targets are included among the set of explanatory variables (see Table 1 ) and are found to be highly significant. It is also worth noting that the primary argument for using the crime rate-that it measures the individual resident's risk of victimization-is less defensible at the neighborhood level. As Harries (1981) notes, the reliability of the crime rate as an indicator of residents' probability of being victimized declines as the level of business activity within the neighborhood expands. 14 The focus on crime density is also motivated by previous research, which finds that the density of crime within the neighborhood has an effect on residential property values that is three times larger than the effect produced by the neighborhood crime rate (Bowes and Ihlanfeldt 2001). In this 2001 paper, crime density has the stronger effect because it has a greater influence on residents' perceptions of whether a crime problem exists within their neighborhood. any particular tract, its value is constant. It is included to account for crime-related unobserved heterogeneity across tracts. eit is the "usual" residual with the usual properties. This error structure necessitates the use of either a FE or RE model. The essential difference between these two estimators is that RE is based upon variation in the data across and within tracts, whereas FE ignores variation across tracts and relies solely on within-tract variation to obtain its estimates. For short and wide panels like the one used here, it is frequently the case that there is insufficient variation over time to obtain precise parameter estimates with FE. In the present case, four MARTA rail stations opened over the years covered by the crime panel, resulting in 9-20 tracts experiencing a change in rail transit access, depending on the size of the rail station impact area (defined below). Hence there is variation in the key test variable. However, the theory presented in section 3 indicates that the effect of rail access on neighborhood crime depends on certain neighborhood characteristics. To capture these dependencies, it is necessary that the rail access variable be interacted with five different neighborhood descriptors, as described in detail below. As discussed in section 6, all of these interaction terms are statistically significant. The within-tract variation of rail accessibility that is available within the crime panel is too limited to reliably estimate the coefficients on rail access and all of its interactions with these other variables, which precludes the use of FE. In fact, given the complexity of MARTA's effect on neighborhood crime, even a much longer panel than the one we use would probably not resolve this problem. Fortunately, however, by drawing upon the full variation in the data (both within and between tracts), it is possible to estimate the MARTA parameters with some confidence using RE. Because there is sufficient within-tract variation to estimate FE models that include a more limited set of interaction variables, results from these models are also reported below. The principal concern that arises when using RE is that the consistency of its estimates hinges upon the orthogonality between vi and the regressors. Of course, it is also assumed, as in ordinary least squares (OLS), that the regressors are uncorrelated with ei. Correlations between the regressors and the error terms result from the omission of important explanatory variables from the model. Because our models explain roughly 90% of the neighborhood's density of crime, we believe that it is unlikely that an important variable has been omitted from our models. Additional support for the assumption that vi is orthogonal to the regressors comes from conducting a Hausman ( effect of rail transit accessibility on neighborhood crime varies nonlinearly with w, N, and A. w is the expected payoff to crime inside the neighborhood. Although a number of the explanatory variables proxy w, the measure of greatest interest and arguably the single proxy most highly correlated with the criminal's true expected bounty is the neighborhood's median income. Both residential and commercial loot tend to be high in neighborhoods with higher income households. To capture transit's nonlinear effect with w, marta is therefore interacted with the median income of the neighborhood and the square of median income. A is the proximity of the neighborhood to crime targets outside the neighborhood with high expected payoffs (net of their expected penalty), whereas N is the neighborhood's proximity to outside criminals. Both A and N are proxied by the distance of the tract to poor people. This is based on the expectation that if poor people surround the tract, A will tend to be low, whereas N will tend to be high.l9 20 The distance to the poor is measured for tract i as distpoori = E poorj X dij) Expected payoffs are higher in neighborhoods containing nonpoor people. Expected penalties are also higher in these neighborhoods because greater investments in private protection increase the probability of apprehension. Therefore, A will increase with the average distance to poor people only if expected payoffs rise more rapidly than expected penalties. 20 A strong correlation between crime and poverty is a consistent finding in the literature. For some recent evidence, see Center for Urban Poverty and Social Change, Case Western Reserve University, http://povertycenter.cwru.edu. 21 Because aC°/0S and aCR/0S have opposite signs in the theoretical model, the expected signs on marta X distpoor and marta X distpoor2 are ambiguous and the estimated signs will depend on the relative strengths of the two effects. for Atlanta. This matrix contains eight industry rows (the same industry groups used by ARC) and seven county columns (those forming the broader Atlanta region identified above). Within each cell the percentage of jobs held by 16-to 24-year-old men without college degrees was computed from the PUMS. The multiplication of Gjkt by ajk therefore provides an estimate of the number of new jobs in a particular industry within a tract located in a particular county that are available to (and taken by) young men.
Fixed Effects Models
The means and standard deviations of all of the variables are presented in the Appendix. Separate sets of statistics are reported for the full sample of tracts, tracts with rail access (marta > 0), and tracts without rail access (marta = 0). Neighborhoods with rail access have higher crime, lower median incomes, and higher densities of blacks, poor people, and retail and manufacturing employment than neighborhoods without rail access. These results are not surprising because Atlanta's demographic and employment gradients are typical of a large metropolitan area (Muth 1969) , and MARTA tracts are, on average, located closer to the metropolitan center than non-MARTA tracts.
The FE models include the rail access variable (marta) along with its interactions with the median income of the neighborhood (marta X medinc) and its square (marta X medinc2). Also included are the rest of the time-varying variables (see Table 1 ). Results are reported in Table 2 for total crime, property crime, and violent crime using both the density of crime and the crime rate as dependent variables. For all six models, the three marta variables are jointly significant at the 1% level, which indicates that rail access has a statistically significant effect on neighborhood crime. In all cases this effect is found to vary nonlinearly with the median income of the neighborhood-the estimated coefficient on marta X medinc is positive and significant-whereas the estimated coefficient on marta X medinc2 is negative and significant. To visualize how the crime effect of rail access depends on neighborhood income, the partial derivative of property crime density (property crime rate) with respect to rail access is graphed as a function of median income (see Figure 1 and Figure  2) .24 There is little difference between the crime density and crime rate graphs. For crime density, the partial derivative is a small negative number below 6,500, between $6,500 and $33,000 it is a positive number that peaks at $20,000, and above $33,000 it becomes increasingly negative. These results, which parallel those reported below for the RE models, suggest that rail access has opposite effects on central city versus suburban neighborhoods. In the typical central city neighborhood (median income in 1994 = $24,799), rail access has a positive effect on crime, whereas in the typical suburban neighborhood (median income in 1994 = $41,084), rail access reduces crime.25
The FE models also show that median income has no effect of its own on crime and that better access to jobs suitable for young men reduces crime. These results are also consistent with those reported below from the RE models. 24 The graphs for total and violent crime are highly similar to those for property crime. 25 The results reported in Table 2 use a quarter mile as the rail station impact area. Using this variable, nine neighborhoods experienced a change in rail access over the panel period. These neighborhoods represented a wide range of income levels (mean median income = $25,479 with a standard deviation of $10,527). FE models were also estimated using a half mile and three quarters of a mile as the size of the impact area. Using these variables, 13 and 20 neighborhoods experienced a change in rail access, respectively. There is little difference between the results using these larger impact areas and those reported in Table 2 . 
Random Effects Models
The RE models include the full set of rail access interactions (marta X povden, marta X medinc, marta X medinc2, marta X distpoor, and marta X distpoor2) as well as both the time-varying (X) and time-invariant (W) control variables. Table 3 reports the results from estimating total crime, property crime, and violent crime RE models using the density of crime as the dependent variable.26 In all cases, RE is supported by the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test for RE, a test that var(vi) = 0 (see the bottom of Table 3 ).27 The Hausman test results indicate that the null hypothesis of 26 As argued in section 4, crime density is preferred over the crime rate as the dependent variable given that we are interested in explaining the spatial distribution of crime across neighborhoods. The correct specification of a crime rate model would include different definitions of the time-invariant variables than those employed in the crime density model. However, it is worth noting that simply substituting the crime rate for the crime density in the RE models yields results that are consistent with our conclusion that rail access increases crime within the central city but reduces crime in the suburbs. 27 As noted in section 4, the RE estimator draws on variation in the data both across and within tracts in obtaining its estimates, whereas the FE estimator relies solely on within-tract variation. A third estimator that can be used with panel data is the between estimator (BE). BE relies solely on cross-sectional variation within the data and amounts to regressing the annual mean level of crime for each tract on the annual means of the independent variables. A comparison of results between RE and BE models indicates the relative importance of between versus within-tract variation in generating the RE estimates. The more the RE estimates are based on within-tract variation in the data, the stronger the case that they reflect true causality. In the BE models, marta and its interactions with the neighborhood variables are jointly significant at the 1% level in the total, property, and violent crime equations. However, the precision of the estimated coefficients on the individual variables is substantially greater with the RE models than with the BE models. In the BE models, only one of the six rail access variables is statistically significant in any of the models: the interaction between marta and povden is significant at the 5% level in the total and violent crime models and is significant at the 10% level in the property crime model. The weaker results obtained for the BE models suggests that within-tract variation plays an important role in generating the RE estimates. no correlation between vi and the regressors cannot be rejected in the property and violent crime models, which supports the appropriateness of the RE estimator.28 The results confirm that the effect of rail transit access on neighborhood crime varies with the characteristics of the neighborhood. In the total and property crime equations, the interaction between marta and povden is statistically significant at the 5% level. This interaction is not quite significant at the 5% level in the violent crime equation. In the total and property crime equations, the interactions marta X medinc and marta X medinc2 are significant at the 1% level. Also in these equations, the interactions marta X distpoor and marta X distpoor2 are individually significant at just below the 10% level and are jointly significant at the 5% level. These results are consistent with the expectation that the crime effects of rail transit accessibility vary nonlinearly with the median income of the neighborhood and the neighborhood's average distance to poor people. However, in the violent crime equations none of the medinc or distpoor interactions are individually or jointly significant.29
Because the effect of rail access on crime varies with neighborhood variables, partial derivatives of crime density with respect to rail access were computed for combinations of three values of medinc ($10,000; $30,000; and $50,000); three value of distpoor (10, 13, and 16 miles); and three values of povden (0, 4, and 8), yielding a total of 27 combinations. The three values used for each variable roughly equal the mean of each variable and one standard deviation above and below the mean. These partial derivatives and their levels of statistical significance are reported in Table 4 for total crime density and property crime density.30
First note that rail access is found to increase neighborhood crime in those neighborhoods located close to poor people (distpoor = 10), except if the neighborhood is a high-income 28 For the total crime model, the null hypothesis is rejected, but only because of a large difference between the estimated coefficients on medinc2 between the RE and FE models. The Hausman test is based on the idea that if vi is uncorrelated with the regressors, then the coefficients that are estimated on the time-varying variables should not statistically differ between the FE and RE models. In both of these models, medinc2 is highly insignificant, but the difference in the coefficients is marginally significant; hence the rejection of the null hypothesis. Excluding medinc2 from the RE model has no effect on the results and causes the Hausman test statistic to become insignificant. 29 The weaker results for violent crime are not unexpected, since our theoretical model applies to only these violent crimes that are economically motivated. 30 To determine whether a partial derivative is significantly different from zero, the variance of each estimate was computed using the statistical formula for the variance of a sum of random variables (Mood, Graybill, and Boes 1974, p.178). This formula accounts for the covariances between the betas retrieved from the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators. neighborhood (medinc = $50,000).3' These positive effects are statistically significant, except at the highest density of poverty. Among neighborhoods that are not close to the poor, rail access is found either not to have a statistically significant effect on crime or to have a negative and statistically significant effect. The absolute magnitudes of the latter effects are largest where povden and medinc are at their maximum values (8 and $50,000). These results suggest that if a neighborhood is located away from poor people, the tendencies of rail transit accessibility to cause criminals living in the neighborhood to commit their crimes elsewhere and to cause less crime by enhancing the job mobility of neighborhood residents either offset or dominate the tendency for crime to rise due to the importation of outside criminals.
The partial derivatives in Table 4 were computed for hypothetical combinations of neighborhood characteristics that are in some cases common but in other cases rare or even nonexistent among the sample of census tracts. In order to investigate transit's effects on actual neighborhoods, partial derivatives were also computed for representative neighborhoods with rail access. Four representative neighborhoods are used: central city black, central city white, suburban black, and suburban white.32 The characteristics of each type of neighborhood can be found in Table 5 . In addition to estimating partial derivatives of crime density with respect to rail access, elasticities were computed at the point of means within each type of neighborhood. Results are reported in Table 5 . neighborhoods comes from Table 4 , which shows that the key factor in determining whether rail access will increase or decrease neighborhood crime is the neighborhood's average distance to poor people. As this distance increases, fewer outside criminals come into the neighborhood using rail transit, allowing the negative effects to overcome the positive effect.34
Although the relative magnitudes of the two negative effects that cause rail access to reduce crime in the suburbs cannot be determined with the available data, the most reasonable scenario is that crime declines primarily because rail access expands the employment opportunities of neighborhood residents, especially crime-prone youth who are heavily dependent on public transit.35 That this is the case is supported by the results obtained with the variable that measures young men's proximity to jobs (jaccess): increases in jaccess are found to strongly reduce the density of neighborhood crime.
34 Table 4 also explains the larger absolute values of the partial derivatives estimated for the white suburban neighborhood in comparison with the black suburban neighborhood. Although each neighborhood is approximately the same distance from poor people, median income is about $7,500 higher in the white neighborhood. As illustrated in Table 4 , transit reduces crime more in higher income neighborhoods. 35 A referee of this paper suggested that rail access may also reduce crime in the suburbs if fewer crime-prone families choose to live in neighborhoods containing rail access. Hence regardless of whether job opportunities are improved by reducing the distance to jobs or by reducing the time it takes to get to jobs, the effect is to increase the opportunity cost of crime among young offenders.
There is, however, an alternative explanation for the suburban results: more police resources may be allocated to those neighborhoods with rail access, which may cause crime to be lower within these neighborhoods. Allocating more resources to transit neighborhoods may be law enforcement officials' response to neighborhood residents' concerns over station-induced crime. Although marta has the expected positive sign, its estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. The results therefore provide little support for the alternative explanation for the suburban results.
Finally, there are the results obtained with the control variables. Six variables are remarkable in their effects. The densities of poverty, black population, retail employment, manufacturing employment, and vacant housing all have positive and statistical significant effects on total neighborhood crime, whereas the job accessibility of young men significantly reduces crime. One anomalous result is that neither youth density variable (males1519 and males2024) is significant in any of the crime models, despite the fact that youth are known to be crime prone. An explanation for the insignificance of the youth variables is that these variables are time-invariant and their variation across tracts is limited.37
Conclusion
The consensus opinion among transportation planners is that rail transit must play a major role in reducing air pollution and automobile congestion within urban areas. The favored approach is to build more stations and to encourage transit-oriented development around existing stations. The success of these policies will in part depend upon transit's effect on neighborhood crime. On this issue there has been much speculation but little empirical evidence.
The relationship between rail access and neighborhood crime is more complex than commonly recognized. Although the opening of a rail station may increase access to the neighborhood by outside criminals, it may also induce criminals living within the neighborhood to commit their crimes elsewhere. In addition, the station may increase the job accessibility of crime-prone neighborhood residents, causing them to choose legitimate work, rather than crime. The results obtained from the RE models suggest that rail access does increase crime within those neighborhoods that are both close to poor people and are not high-income. Because poor people are concentrated within the central city, rail access is found to increase crime within both the representative white and black central city neighborhood. This conclusion can also be drawn from the results obtained from the FE models, which show that at the income levels that typify central city neighborhoods, rail access has a positive effect on crime. Efforts to attract population and employment to station areas located within the central city may therefore be frustrated by higher crime unless greater deterrence is provided. On the other hand, there is no evidence from either the random or FE models that suburban residents should fear that crime will rise in their neighborhood if rail lines are extended beyond central city boundaries. It is ironic that rail access is actually found to reduce crime in the representative white suburban neighborhood, because most of the opposition to rail transit has come from white suburban residents. This opposition, however, may only superficially have to do with concers over crime. The real motivation may be racial bigotry (Bayor 2000) .
The theory presented in this paper explains the important role that distance to the poor plays in transit's effect on neighborhood crime as the result of travel costs. The farther the neighborhood is located from a criminal, the lower is his expected payoff net of the costs of travel. Hence, even after a neighborhood obtains a rail station, if the criminal's trip to the neighborhood is lengthy he may find that net returns are higher closer to home. However, it was also noted that the distance to the poor effect may reflect the criminal's expected probability of apprehension. The criminal may feel comfortable using rail transit to get to a nearby neighborhood that he has some familiarity with, but he may be reluctant to take transit to a distant neighborhood because it is not part of his "mental map," and he therefore has less confidence in his ability to succeed in his crime. If it is the unfamiliarity of the distant neighborhood, rather than the travel costs, that deters the criminal, then distance may become less of a barrier over time. That is, the criminal's access to the neighborhood by rail transit may eventually expand his mental map to include the neighborhood. This suggests that an issue for 37 For both variables the coefficient of variation is equal to one. future research would be to investigate how transit's effect on neighborhood crime might vary over time. A suburban neighborhood with rail access may be safe today but not indefinitely into the future.
The results presented in this paper are based on the experience of a single metropolitan areaAtlanta, Georgia. Care should be taken in generalizing the conclusions of this study to other areas. However, the three factors that influence transit's effect on neighborhood crime exist within all metropolitan areas. Hence transit's effect on neighborhood crime will vary across neighborhoods, with neighborhoods closer to poor people more likely to experience an increase in crime from transit access. From a policy perspective, a relatively greater proportion of police resources should be allocated to these neighborhoods, especially within those metropolitan areas where transit-oriented development is a high priority in the battle against urban sprawl. A final caveat also points to a suggestion for future research. Although this study estimated both FE and RE models, results from the latter models received greater attention because they permitted a full investigation of the variation in effects that rail access has on neighborhood crime. However, causality is more difficult to establish when using an RE model. This is acknowledged in the present study, although the consistency in the results between the RE and FE models, the results from Hausman tests, and the fact that the RE estimates rely heavily on within-tract variation in the data suggest that my findings reflect the causal relationships hypothesized by our theoretical model. Nevertheless, the use of longer crime panels that would allow the estimation of more complex FE models is recommended in future investigations of the effects of rail transit access on neighborhood crime. 
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